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PRISON REFORM ISSUES FOR THE EIGHTIES:
MODIFICATION AND DISSOLUTION OF
INJUNCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
by Sarah N. Welling* and Barbara W. Jones**
During the past two decades, federal courts have become involved
in the supervision of state and local prison systems. This supervisory
role is the result of a new type of litigation, the institutional reform
lawsuit.1 These lawsuits originate when prisoners sue state or local
prison administrators, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confine-
ment. Plaintiffs usually seek a permanent injunction outlining a plan to
eliminate the offending conditions. If an injunction is granted, the court
will retain jurisdiction after it is entered to monitor compliance. Often
this implementation phase lasts for years.
The majority of prison reform lawsuits were filed in the 1960's
and 1970's.2 Early prison reform litigation focused on the definition
of substantive rights,' the appropriate extent of injunctive
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D..
University of Kentucky.
** General Counsel for Corrections, Commonwealth of Kentucky;, B.A., J.D., University of
Kentucky. The authors gratefully acknowledge Professor Robert G. Schwcmm for his thoughtful
review of an earlier draft of this article.
1. Institutional reform lawsuits protect rights by defining and implementing changes in the
operation of complex social institutions. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge In Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institu-
tional Reform Litigation, 78 COLuM. L REv. 784 (1978); Note, The Modification of Consent
Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARv. L REv. 1020 (1986). This article examines
the complex social institutions of state and local prison systems.
2. See, e.g., infra notes 3-4; see also Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of
Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (1986) (the 1960's and 1970's
were "the heyday of equity in the federal courts").
3. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (disciplinary procedures); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (mail censorship regulations); Pugh v. Locke. 406 F. Supp. 318
(M.D. Ala. 1976) (overcrowding), affid as modified sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (medical treatment), affd in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied., 421
U.S. 948 (1975); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (forced, uncompensated farm
labor prison conditions; and racial segregation), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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relief,' and the role of the courts in administering relief.5 As prison
litigation matured, the normal evolution of these lawsuits led to new
questions taking center stage in the 1980's, questions of injunction,
modification, and dissolution.
Modification has been discussed frequently by both courts and
commentators. Dissolution, in contrast, has been the focus of relatively
little attention. This article begins with a summary examination of
prison reform litigation, and then analyzes the standards for modifica-
tion and dissolution of injunctions. The article concludes that in spite of
some ambiguous decisions and some references to a new, more flexible
modification standard, courts in prison reform cases are actually apply-
ing the strict standard formulated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Swift & Co.' In addition, courts are uncertain whether to use
different modification standards for consent decrees and litigated in-
junctions. The courts that have distinguished the two types of orders
disagee on the impact of the distinction. This article stresses that the
best approach is not to distinguish consent decrees and litigated injunc-
tions, but rather to apply the strict modification standard to both types
of orders.
As for dissolution, courts agree that the critical factor is that there
be no risk of noncompliance in the future. In assessing the risk of fu-
ture noncompliance, courts have identified several relevant factors but
have overlooked the educational impact of prison reform decisions. The
dissolution standard is good and the few cases decided indicate that the
courts are applying it conscientiously. However, the potential exists for
the courts to succumb to intuitive reluctance to dissolving injunctions.
Courts should resist this temptation and dissolve injunctions if the dis-
solution standard is met. The article finally concludes that a stringent
standard for injunctive modification, in combination with the current
standard for dissolution, will provide the necessary institutional reform.
4. See. e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (enjoinment); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976) (order overhauling police disciplinary procedures exceeded authority); Kendrick v. Bland,
740 F.2d 432 (6th Cir. 1984) (enjoinment from performing certain responsibilities inappropriate
where defendants exhibited a history of good faith cooperation); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,
1246 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Federal courts lack the power to interfere with decisions made by state
prison officials, absent constitutional violations."); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982)
(discretion in tailoring a remedial injunction is not unconfined), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042
(1983).
5. See supra note 4.
6. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
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I. BACKGROUND: A PRIMER ON PRISON REFORM LITIGATION
Prison reform litigation usually begins when inmates sue state or
local prison administrators, alleging that the confinement conditions are
unconstitutional, either as cruel and unusual punishment or as a denial
of due process.7 Early cases challenging prison conditions determined
that the conditions violated the eighth amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment and, therefore, warranted judicial intru-
sion upon state administration of the prison.8 Later, courts decided that
additional protections in the Bill of Rights applied to incarcerated
felons to a limited extent.'
Although remedies for prison conditions lawsuits include dam-
ages,10 plaintiffs usually seek a permanent injunction.11 These injunc-
tions have been called "structural" because they "restructure the or-
ganization to eliminate a threat to [constitutional] values posed by the
present institutional arrangements"1 and are "the means by which
these reconstructive directives are transmitted."13 Structural injunc-
7. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (suit brought by
inmates of the Texas Department of Corrections); Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir.
1983) (prison inmate filing pro se), cert. dismissed, 465 US. 1014 (1984); Battle v. Anderson,
564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977) (prison inmate filing pro so); Ramos v. Lamm. 485 F. Supp. 122
(D. Colo. 1979) (inmates brought suit naming the governor of Colorado, the executive director of
the Department of Corrections, and the superintendent of the maximum security unit as defend-
ants), affd in part and remanded, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981); Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md. 1978) (class action brought by state prison-
ers), modified, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978). Inmates have challenged the adequacy of living
space, see. e.g., Ruiz, 811 F.2d 856; food, exercise, lawbooks, security, visitation, see, e.g., Duran
v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985); and medical services, see, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977). In evaluating these claims, courts have examined
the totality of the circumstances rather than isolated factors. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
363 n.10 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The Court today adopts the totality-of-the-circum-
stances test.").
8. See, e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (deliberate indifference to serious medical need).
9. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (right of access to the courts); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process as applied to disciplinary proceedings); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (free speech as applied to censorship of mail); Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (religion); Johnson v. Avery, 393 US. 483 (1969) (no absolute ban
on prisoners assisting each other with habeas corpus suits).
10. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (punitive damages available to inmates
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1318-19 (E.D. Va. 1973)
(compensatory damages allowed for "psychic damages and suffering").
11. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 813.
12. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARM. L Rv.
1, 2 (1979). See generally 0. Fiss. INJUNcrnONS 1, 415-17 (1972); Jost, supra note 2; Note, supra
note 1.
13. Fiss, supra note 12, at 2.
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tions have been entered to limit punitive isolation, 14 enjoin poor sanita-
tion 5 and overcrowding,"6 and mandate adequate medical care.17 Usu-
ally the injunctions are very detailed.
Injunctions in prison reform lawsuits can be entered in two ways.
One alternative is litigation, which allows the judge to define the terms
of the injunction. The other alternative is for the parties to settle the
lawsuit and negotiate the terms of an injunction, which must then be
approved by the court.18 These negotiated injunctions, or consent de-
crees, are court orders embodying the parties' negotiated resolution of
the litigation.19
Aside from the procedural difference in the way litigated injunc-
tions and consent decrees are derived, other distinctions exist. First,
consent decrees usually give the plaintiff more relief than the law pro-
vides,20 while litigated decrees can only give the plaintiff the minimum
required by the law.21 Second, consent decrees generally lack the clear
purpose of litigated decrees, 2 2 so interpretational problems arise when a
court attempts to facilitate the decree's purpose.2 3 Third, the terms of a
litigated injunction are interpreted through principles of equity,24 but a
consent decree is a hybrid-a contract and a judgment2 -- so its terms
14. See. e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
15. See, e.g., Adams v. Mathis, 458 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Ala. 1978), affd, 614 F.2d 42 (5th
Cir. 1980).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Once a suit is filed, the court must approve any consent decree. See, e.g., United States v.
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971); System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
Moreover, many prison reform suits are litigated as class actions, and Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23(e) requires court approval of any settlement involving a class. FED. R. Civ, P. 23(E).
19. Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class Ac-
tion Litigation, 1983 U. ILL L. REV. 579, 584; see also Note, supra note 1, at 1020 n.2 ("A
consent decree is a compromise reached by two parties that is approved by a judge. It is thus a
hybrid of a judicial order and a private contract. The parties themselves fix the terms of a consent
decree, typically after lengthy negotiations, and a judge adds his signature to the pact.") An
example of a consent decree is attached as an appendix to Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp. 21
(W.D. Ky. 1981).
20. See System Fed'n, 364 U.S. 642; Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 1985);
Note, supra note 1, at 1027 n.41.
21. See Pennhust State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Washington v.
Penwell, 700 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1983); see also supra note 4.
22. See United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 563 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984); Penwell, 700 F.2d at 575; see also Jost, supra note 2, at 1144.
23. See infra note 118 for a discussion of the significance of interpreting the decree's purpose.
24. System Fed'n, 364 U.S. 642; United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
25. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236-37 n.10 (1975); see
Anderson, supra note 19, at 584-86; lost, supra note 2, at 1103; see also supra note 19 and
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are interpreted primarily through contract law and and then by resort
to principles of equity.28 Finally, some courts and commentators sug-
gest that consent decrees should be more difficult to modify than liti-
gated injunctions.
Consent decrees are used frequently in prison reform litigation,28
and have been more popular than litigated injunctions for several rea-
sons. A consent decree allows structural change to be made relatively
quickly, rather than awaiting the end of litigation.30 The defendants'
attitude toward compliance may be better with a consent decree than a
coercive judicial decree.31 A consent decree may save public money and
avoid the risk of publicity from an adverse civil rights judgment.3 2 Set-
tlement also saves judicial resources.33 Finally, the parties can achieve
more individualized relief when they negotiate the terms of the decree
because they are more familiar than the judge with all the nuances of
the conffict.
Consent decrees also have some drawbacks. In entering into a de-
cree, the defendant state officials agree to changes that may not be
constitutionally required. Increased concessions by the defendants re-
quire more extensive monitoring by the court. This monitoring can be
more expensive than the cost of a litigated judgment with an order pro-
viding for only the minimum constitutional remedy. Moreover, the im-
plementation phase can become so complex, based on the detailed
terms in the consent decree, that more court time is absorbed than if
the case had been litigated originally. Finally, a consent decree has
drawbacks in that the defendant gives the plaintiffs contractual rights
accompanying text.
26. American Cyanamid, 719 F.2d at 564; Penwell, 700 F.2d at 573.
27. Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980); see Jost, supra note 2, at 1129 n.173, 1162. The significance of this
final distinction is considered in the discussion of modification. See infra notes 113-23 and accom-
panying text.
28. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Fedcral courts are
currently managing corrections systems under consent decrees in thirty-four states. 19 COniREC-
TIONs DIGEST No. 5, at 1 (Mar. 19, 1988).
29. See Anderson, supra note 19, at 580-82; Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdic-
tion Over Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 42 U. MIAmii L Rav. 401,402 (1987)
[hereinafter Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction over Consent Decrees] (consent
decrees have become widely used over the last thirty years).
30. See Anderson, supra note 19, at 580-82.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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above the legal minimum and thereby relinquishes more control over
the penal system.
Once the injunction is entered, either by consent or after trial, the
implementation phase begins.35 Implementation usually involves dis-
putes over interpretation of terms and allegations of noncompliance. If
a dispute over terms arises, the court will first interpret the decree to
clarify the obligations of the parties. 8 Then, if allegations of noncom-
pliance are made, the court has several enforcement options. The first
step usually involves judicial threats,3 7 sometimes coupled with a spe-
cific compliance order.38 If noncompliance continues, the court may
hold a party in civil contempt8 9 One important limitation on this en-
forcement option is that impossibility is a defense to a civil contempt
citation. 0 If noncompliance continues, the more drastic enforcement
powers of the court are to order a release of inmates"1 or to close a
facility. 2 These measures are a last resort that courts are reluctant to
use.
43
II. DEFINING THE STANDARD FOR MODIFICATION OF INJUNCTIONS
Modification of structural injunctions in institutional reform law-
suits has recently received much attention from both courts44 and com-
35. Id. at 583.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971); United States v, Atlantic
Ref. Co., 360 U.S. 19 (1959); Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952).
37. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 838 & n.449.
38. See, e.g., Morris v. Travisono, 373 F. Supp. 177 (D.R.I. 1974) (court enjoined defendant
from continued violations of original consent decree), affid, 509 F.2d 1358 (1st Cir. 1975).
39. See, e.g., Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984); Gomes v. Moran, 605
F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1979); Jordan v. Arnold, 472 F. Supp. 265 (M.D. Pa. 1979), appeal dismissed,
631 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1980); see generally Special Project, supra note 1, at 838-41.
40. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1950) (ordinarily, one charged with con-
tempt makes a complete defense by proving that he is unable to comply); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333
U.S. 56, 72-77 (1947) (a contempt order should not issue if there is a present inability to comply);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Bangor & A.R.R., 380 F.2d 570, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(inability to comply is a defense in coercive contempt proceedings); see generally Special Project,
supra note 1, at 839.
41. See. e.g., Newman, 740 F.2d at 1520-22.
42. Inmates v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 689-91 (D. Mass. 1973), a Od, 494 F.2d 1196
(1st Cir. 1974).
43. See, e.g., Newman, 740 F.2d at 1521 (release of prisoners only required if state cannot
continue confinement in constitutional facility).
44. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987); Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756
(7th Cir. 1985); Newman, 740 F.2d 1513; Washington v. Penwell, 700 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1983);
Gomes v. Moran, 605 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1979).
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mentators. 5 This spate of attention is due to confficting signals from
the courts regarding the standard for granting modification.
A. The Original Standard for Modification
The original standard for modifying permanent injunctions was
formulated and developed in four Supreme Court cases.4 The leading
case is United States v. Swift & Co.,47 a Sherman Act antitrust action
brought to dissolve a monopoly of five meat-packers. The parties en-
tered into a consent decree in 1920 that enjoined the defendants from
maintaining a monopoly and from engaging in, or continuing, any com-
bination in restraint of commerce.48 The decree explicitly defined pro-
hibited conduct. A permanent injunction was ordered, and the court
retained jurisdiction to enforce the order. 9
Ten years later, the defendants petitioned the court to modify the
consent decree to accommodate industry changes." The language of
the consent decree specifically granted the court the power to modify
the decree,5 1 but the Supreme Court noted that even if the authority to
modify had not been included in the decree, principles of equity would
permit modification.52 It stated that this authority exists regardless of
whether the injunction was entered subsequent to litigation or by con-
sent, and that equity demands that a court order not become an instru-
ment of wrong so that the original purpose is defeated.53 The Court
concluded:
We are not framing a decree. We are asking ourselves
whether anything has happened that will justify us now in
45. See. e.g., Jost, supra note 2; Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunc-
tions---Standards for Their Imposition, Modification and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L REV. 27
(1980); Comment, Judicial Modification of Consent Judgments in Institutional Reform Litiga-
tion, 50 BROOKLYN L, REV. 657 (1984); Note. supra note 1.
46. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 US. 561 (1984); Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961);
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). A fifth Supreme Court case, United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 294 (1968), is discussed in text accompanying notes 114-16.
For an extensive analysis of this line of cases, see Jost, supra note 2, at 1107-13, 1121-23, 1152-
61; Steinberg, supra note 45, at 41-43, 47-50; Comment, supra note 45, at 671-73; Note. supra
note 1, at 1022-26.
47. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
48. Id. at 111.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 113-14.
51. Id. at 114.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 114-15.
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changing a decree. The injunction, whether right or wrong, is
not subject to impeachment in its application to the conditions
that existed at its making. We are not at liberty to reverse
under the guise of readjusting . . . . The inquiry for us is
whether the changes are so important that dangers, once sub-
stantial, have become attenuated to a shadow . . . . Nothing
less, than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new
and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was
decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all
concerned."
Applying this standard, the Court held that modification was not war-
ranted because there had not been a sufficient change in industry
conditions. 55
The next two Supreme Court cases involved modification of a per-
manent injunction based on a change in the underlying substantive law.
In System Federation No. 91 v. Wright,5 a consent decree was entered
that enjoined a railroad and various labor unions from discriminating
against any plaintiff. The decree referred to provisions established in
the Railway Labor Act,57 which at that time barred union shops. After
the consent decree was entered, the Railway Labor Act was amended
by Congress to permit union shops.5 8 In response to the amendment,
the unions moved for modification of the consent decree. 9 The modifi-
cation was denied by the district court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.00
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Railway Labor Act
provided the basis for the consent decree and guided the formulation of
its terms."' The Court determined that when Congress amended a sub-
stantive portion of the Act referred to in the consent decree, circum-
stances were so changed that the lower court was erroneous in denying
modification. 2 Under the Swift analysis, the circumstances had so
changed that the decree had become an instrument of wrong.08 The
Court stated that because the Railway Labor Act was the source of the
54. Id. at 119.
55. Id. at 115-20.
56. 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
57. Id. at 644.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 644-45.
60. Id. at 645-46.
61. Id. at 652-53.
62. Id. at 648.
63. Id. at 650-51.
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consent decree, "[t]he parties have no power to require of the court
continuing enforcement of rights the statute no longer gives.""
In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,"5 the Supreme
Court examined whether a change in the law effected through a judi-
cial decision rather than a legislative amendment was sufficient to war-
rant modification. The district court had determined that the Pasadena
schools were unconstitutionally segregated, and ordered the school
board to devise and adopt a plan to redress the racial imbalance, in-
cluding a provision prohibiting a majority of minority students from
attending any one school.6 The board devised such a plan, and the
parties and court accepted it. Four years later, the school board moved
to modify the "no majority" provision of the plan because it would re-
quire rearranging the school zones annually. The district court denied
modification on the ground that in every year but the first one, the
school board had failed to comply with the literal terms of the order.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of modification. 7
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held the
denial of modification to be error. 8 After the trial court's decision in
Pasadena, the Supreme Court had decided Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Board of Education,6 9 which disapproved of precise racial bal-
ancing. Swann created a substantive conflict with the terms of the
Pasadena desegregation plan, and the denial of modification was there-
fore an abuse of discretion. 0
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts71 is the most recent
Supreme Court decision on the authority of courts to modify consent
decrees. In Stotts a consent decree had been entered to increase the
hiring of minorities as fire fighters in Cincinnati. The city later pro-
posed a layoff plan that had a discriminatory impact. Although the
consent decree made no reference to layoff plans, the district court
nonetheless enjoined use of the plan on the basis that it would under-
mine the purpose of the consent decree. 2
64. Id. at 651-52.
65. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
66. Id. at 427-28.
67. Id. at 429.
68. Id. at 438-41.
69. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
70. 427 U.S. at 433-35. See also United States v. Georgia Power Co., 634 F.2d 929, 934 (5th
Cir. 1981) (modification allowed based on change in common law), vacated sub nom. Local Union
No. 84, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. United States, 456 U.S. 952 (1982).
71. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
72. Id. at 567.
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The Supreme Court found that the lower court had gone beyond
the terms of the consent decree when it enjoined the layoff plan.73 The
injunction was not authorized by the consent decree, and it exceeded
the decree's purposes. The Court reasoned that the injunction was es-
sentially an unauthorized modification of the consent decree, 4 and
courts cannot grant modification without consent of the parties or a
showing of changed circumstances that satisfies the requirements of
Swift. Here, neither condition was met, so the injunction was error.
These four cases indicate the Supreme Court's position with re-
spect to modification of injunctions. If the underlying law, whether
statutory or decisional, changes so as to render the injunction inconsis-
tent with the law, modification should be granted. If no change of law
has occurred, Swift sets the standard for determining when modifica-
tion is available.7 5 Stotts made no change in Swift but rather indicated
its continued vitality.76 The Supreme Court's adherence to Swift and
its hostility to modification continues.
B. A Freer Standard for Modification in the Circuit Courts
In contrast with the Supreme Court's attitude, several circuit
courts have endorsed a more lenient standard for granting modification
of consent decrees. The two leading cases articulating the new standard
are institutional reform cases, but do not involve prisons. In 1979, the
Third Circuit allowed modification of a consent decree in Philadelphia
Welfare Rights Organization v. Shapp.78 The court stated:
Where an affirmative obligation is imposed by court order on
the assumption that it is realistically achievable, the court
finds that the defendants have made a good faith effort to
achieve the object by the contemplated means, and the object
nevertheless has not been fully achieved, clearly a court of eq-
uity has power to modify the injunction in the light of
experience.7 9
73. 467 U.S. at 573-75.
74. Id.
75. Furthermore, this standard is codified in FED. R. Civ. P. 60(B)(5), governing relief from
judgments. United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1359 n.16 (7th Cir. 1981), cert
denied sub nom. Augustus v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1291 (1987). See generally Comment,
supra note 45, at 670 n.74.
76. Steinberg, supra note 45, at 43, 59.
77. Note, supra note 1, at 1022, 1031.
78. 602 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979).
79. Id. at 1120-21.
1
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In 1983, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in New York
State Association for Retarded Children v. Carey,80 allowing modifica-
tion of a consent decree that required a public home for the mentally
retarded to move patients to smaller community facilities. The city ar-
gued that the limited housing market made community placement fa-
cilities impossible. The court stated that "[ilt is well recognized that in
institutional reform litigation such as this, judicially-imposed remedies
must be open to adaptation when unforeseen obstacles present them-
selves .... " Shapp and Carey were both decided before Stotts,
therefore, their significance is diminished. Yet even after Stotts was
decided, courts continue to cite these cases as leading precedents.82
C. Prison Cases in the Circuit Courts: Basic Adherence to the Swift!
Stotts Standard
Although the Supreme Court has never defined the standards for
modification specifically in the context of prison reform litigation, sev-
eral circuit courts have addressed this issue. The early decisions apply
the strict standards established in Swift and its progeny to the modifi-
cation requests. For example, in Mayberry v Maroney,8 the Third Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's grant of modification on the ground
that the record showed no evidence of the "changed circumstances"
required by Swift." Similarly, in Gomes v. Moran,85 the First Circuit
endorsed a modification, but only because intervening judicial decisions
rendered the decree inconsistent with the law.86 The case thus fell
within the System Federated-Pasadena change of law doctrine.
In contrast, some of the later circuit court prison reform decisions
seem to endorse the more flexible approach to modification articulated
in Shapp and Carey. In Newman v. Graddick,87 the Eleventh Circuit
stated that "modification can be considered when. . . significant time
has passed and objectives have not been met, . . . continuance is no
longer warranted, . . . [or] continuation would be inequitable." 88 The
80. 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
81. Id. at 969.
82. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Duran v. Elrod,
760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985).
83. 558 F.2d 1159 (3d Cir. 1977).
84. Id. at 1163-64.
85. 605 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1979).
86. Id. at 30-31.
87. 740 F.2d 1513 (lth Cir. 1984).
88. Id. at 1520 (citations omitted).
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court characterized the decree as provisional and tentative, stating that
"[t]he question is whether conduct or conditions have changed that
would justify modification."89 Consequently, the court remanded the
case for reconsideration of modification under these standards.9 0
In 1985, the Seventh Circuit recognized a flexible modification
standard in Duran v. Elrod.91 Relying on Carey, Shapp, and Newman,
the court stated that "recent decisions have suggested that a more lib-
eral standard than that laid down in Swift for exercising the power to
modify . . . is appropriate in the case of decrees supervising public in-
stitutions . *.". . The court held, however, that a choice between old
and new modification standards was unnecessary because the district
court's decision was error under either standard.9
Most recently, in Ruiz v. Lynaugh94 the Fifth Circuit recognized
the emergence of a "less demanding standard for modification of con-
sent decrees . . . within the institutional reform arena." 9 The court
defined the less demanding standard as an approach that permits modi-
fication even if the Swift requirements are not met. It stated that de-
fendants who "establish some change in circumstance," who show that
they have made a good faith effort to comply with the decree, and who
request "a modification that does not frustrate the original and overall
purpose(s) of the decree," meet the standard for modification.90 How-
ever, as in Duran, the court held that a choice between old and new
modification standards was unnecessary because the district court's de-
cision was correct under either standard.97 The emergence of this flexi-
ble approach to modification of injunctions is related to the unique
characteristics of institutional reform lawsuits and the structural in-
junctions they generate. The courts have limited their endorsement of
the more flexible standard to this type of case.98
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1521.
91. 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985).
92. Id. at 758.
93. Id.
94. 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987).
95. Id. at 861.
96. Id. at 861 n.8.
97. 811 F.2d at 862. In Duran, the district court's refusal to modify was held erroneous under
either standard, see supra notes 91-93, whereas in Ruiz, the district court's refusal to modify was
correct under either standard, see supra notes 94-96.
98. In Ruiz, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[c]ourts and commentators have asserted that the
unique nature and demands of institutional reform litigation necessitate a more flexible approach
to modification," Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 861, while in Duran, the Seventh Circuit referred to "decrees
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Some commentators have endorsed the more liberal modification
standard for institutional reform litigation as well.99 One commentator
analyzed the distinctive traits of institutional reform litigation and
identified three characteristic features: the speculative and complex
quality of relief, the role of the government as original defendant, and
the effect of the litigation on nonparties. 10 ° That commentator argued
that each of these characteristics militates for a more flexible approach
to modification.10 1
Although the language of Newman, Duran, and Ruiz suggests that
the standards for granting modification may be becoming more flexible,
closer scrutiny of the cases reveals adherence to the strict
Swift-Stotts standard. The Duran and Ruiz courts acknowledged the
existence of a more flexible standard, but neither court applied the
"new" standard because it would not have changed the outcome of ei-
ther case.102
The more ambiguous opinion is Newman v. Graddick,0 3 where the
court cites Carey and indicates that a more flexible standard may be
applicable to prison reform consent decrees.1 4 The court discusses the
flexible standard, but concludes only that the question is "whether con-
duct or conditions have changed that would justify modification. 10°
The reference to changed conditions is very similar to the terminology
used by the Swift Court, so Newman can be interpreted to comport
with Swift. However, the Newman court's phrasing seems to temper or
dilute the shrill language of Swift, which provided that "nothing less
than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions" would justify modification.106 Moreover, the ambiguity is
exacerbated because the Eleventh Circuit does not apply either stan-
dard to the record in the case, but rather remands for consideration by
the district court. Thus Newman sends mixed signals and cannot be
supervising public institutions . . . ." Duran, 760 F.2d at 758.
99. See, e.g., Jost, supra note 2, at 1146; Note, supra note 1, at 1039; cf. Steinberg, supra
note 45, at 71 (neither the Swift standard nor lower court formulations are necessarily the appro-
priate standard; rather, courts should engage in ad hoc balancing test). But see Comment, supra
note 45, at 677 (no consensus among commentators for modification under "freer hand"
standard).
100. Note, supra note 1, at 1033-37.
101. Id. at 1033-39.
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. 740 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
104. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
105. 740 F.2d at 1520.
106. United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
1988]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
interpreted to establish a more flexible approach to modification.
More confusing yet is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington
v. Penwell,10 7 where state officials entered into a consent decree that
required them to fund nine months of legal services for the inmates and
to formulate plans for the provision of such legal services in the fu-
ture.108 When a dispute arose over these provisions, the district judge
modified the decree to eliminate them, declared that the purpose of the
consent decree had otherwise been met, and terminated the litiga-
tion. °10  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the modification, 0 explaining that
the Constitution did not mandate the provision of legal services to the
extent provided for in the consent decree."" The district judge applied
a very liberal standard of modification, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the decision. This case is an aberration that is irreconcilable with the
others. Careful scrutiny of the other cases reveals the continued vitality
of the Swift standard. Thus, while courts discuss a more relaxed stan-
dard, none has explicitly relied on that standard.
112
D. Distinctions in the Standards for Modification of Consent Decrees
and Litigated Injunctions
Up to this point, fully litigated injunctions and consent decrees
have been treated as interchangeable, but a subsidiary issue is whether
the modification standards for the two types of orders are the same.
The courts have not provided a clear answer. In Swift, the Court stated
that "[a] continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is
107. 700 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1983).
108. Id. at 572.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 574.
111. Consent decrees generally require the defendants to do more than the constitution man-
dates. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. The court's conclusion that modification was
warranted because the consent decree provisions in question were not constitutionally required is
odd and has drastic implications for the continued vitality of consent decrees. The implications of
this case are currently the focal point in Duran v. Carruthers, 678 F. Supp. 839, 851 (D.N.M.
1988). The district court recently denied a motion by the defendants to vacate major portions of
the consent decree on the basis that its provisions were not constitutionally required. For author-
ity, the defendants cited Penwell. In ruling against the defendants, the district court made a val-
iant effort to distinguish Penwell. See Duran, 678 F. Supp. at 851 n.23. The defendants filed
notice of appeal on March 10, 1988. Prison officials are watching this case closely.
112. The difference between talk and action was recognized by Judge Hill in Ruiz v.
Lynaugh, where he specifically lamented the panel's reluctance to adopt explicitly the flexible
approach. He wrote, "I believe we should explicitly endorse the flexible approach for modification
of instituitional reform consent decrees as a guide for district courts involved in on-going and
future public law litigation." 811 F.2d 856, 863 (5th Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., concurring).
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subject always to adaptation . . . The result is all one whether the
decree has been entered after litigation or by consent. In either event, a
court does not abdicate its power to. . .modify its mandate."' This
language clearly indicates that there is no distinction between consent
decrees and litigated injunctions for purposes of modification. The
water was muddied, however, in 1968 when the Court decided United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp."4 In United Shoe, the Court
allowed modification of a fully litigated injunction and distinguished
Swift on the basis that "the defendants [in Swift] sought relief not to
achieve the purposes of the provisions of the decree but to escape their
impact."' 15 United Shoe seems to allow modification more freely than
Swift, but the extent of the holding is uncertain. Although the Court
did not explicitly limit its holding to litigated injunctions, some com-
mentators have concluded that the law announced in United Shoe ex-
tends only to litigated injunctions."'
There is uncertainty whether a distinction exists in the standards
for modifying consent decrees and litigated injunctions, and if a dis-
tinction does exist, whether it should render modification of consent de-
crees more or less difficult than modification of litigated injunctions.'"
Swift seems conclusive that no distinction exists; however, United Shoe
provides some basis for concluding that the Supreme Court recognizes
113. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 US. 106, 114 (1932) (citations omitted).
114. 391 U.S. 244 (1968). See generally Jost, supra note 2 at 1119; Steinberg, supra note 45.
at 47-48; Note, supra note 1, at 1024-26.
115. 391 US. at 249.
116. See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 1025 n.33.
117. One recent analysis of modification standards for litigated injunctions and consent de-
crees is provided by Professor Jost. See Jost, supra note 2. He distinguishes consent decrees from
litigated injunctions and contends that courts should be more hesitant to modify consent decrees
than litigated injunctions for the following reasons: (1) A consent decree is a contract and is,
therefore, presumably the most efficient allocation of risk; (2) easy modification of consent decrees
would frustrate the parties and, therefore, deter settlement; (3) strict modification standards com-
pel the parties to bargain with each other, which is preferable to judicial modification because the
parties have superior knowledge of the facts; and (4) it is more difficult to discern the original
intent behind a consent decree than a litigated injunction, therefore, it is more difficult for the
court to modify a consent decree to facilitate the original intent. Id. at 1124-30. 1142-45, 1162;
see also Steinberg, supra note 45, at 65 & n.188. Although Professor Jost writes that consent
decrees should be more difficult to modify, he points out that modification must still be available
for consent decrees. Jost, supra note 2, at 1146-47, 1162. Otherwise, one danger or a judicial
standard that makes modification significantly more difficult to establish for consent decrees than
fully litigated orders would be to deter parties from settling their lawsuits. See Philadelphia Wel-
fare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026
(1980).
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a distinction in modification standards.11 While no circuit court has
considered the question directly, some circuits have hinted at support
for a distinction. One Third Circuit decision" and one Ninth Circuit
decision 20 seemed to consider the question of whether the injunction
was litigated or consensual to be a relevant factor in the modification
analysis. Notwithstanding the fact that these courts agreed that the
type of injunction is relevant, they disagreed on what impact the dis-
tinction should have. The Third Circuit hinted that a consent decree is
more difficult to modify,121 while the Ninth Circuit implied that a con-
sent decree is easier to modify, at least as to those terms in the decree
not constitutionally required. 22 However, the language from the Third
118. One factor courts often cite in deciding whether modification is warranted is whether
conditions have changed so much that the injunction is no longer serving its original purpose. See
generally Jost, supra note 2, at 1142-48 (modification to effectuate the rights of the beneficiary as
one form of flexibility). The relevance of this factor was first suggested in Swift where the Court
stated that a court may modify an order "if satisfied that what it has been doing has been turned
through changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong." United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932). Later, the Supreme Court interpreted Swift explicitly to establish the
role of the injunction's purpose. In United Shoe, the Court stated: "Swift teaches that a decree
may be changed upon an appropriate showing, and it holds that it may not be changed in the
interests of the defendant if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree. . . have
not been fully achieved." United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968).
Many of the circuit courts have relied on this "purpose analysis" as one factor in deciding prison
modification questions. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 861 n.8 (5th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam); Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1520 (11 th Cir. 1984); Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d
420, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1981).
This approach has one drawback. To determine whether the injunction is still serving the
litigated purpose, the purpose must be identified. While litigated decrees have a clear purpose (for
example, in United Shoe, the elimination of monopoly practices), consent decrees are just con-
tracts between parties, which often do not have an identifiable purpose. See United States v.
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971); Washington v. Penwell, 700 F.2d 570, 575 (9th Cir.
1983). See generally Jost, supra note 2, at 1143-44. Thus, the courts' analyses of whether an
injunction is still serving its purpose may be helpful for modifying litigated injunctions, but it
creates confusion for modifying consent decrees. The point is not that the courts' reliance on the
purpose of the injunction renders modification easier for one type of injunction or another, but
only that the "purpose analysis" tends to reinforce distinctions between litigated injunctions and
consent decrees.
119. Shapp, 602 F.2d at 1120.
120. Penwell, 700 F.2d 570; see supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
121. The court stated: "And where, as here, the defendants made a free, calculated and delib-
erate choice to submit to an agreed upon decree rather than seek a more favorable litigated judg-
ment their burden under Rule 60(b) is perhaps even more formidable than had they litigated and
lost." 602 F.2d at 1120 (emphasis added).
122. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's modification of a consent decree where the
trial judge had eliminated a provision requiring the funding of legal services for prison inmates on
the grounds that it was not mandated by the Constitution. The court ruled that the prison officials
who had consented to the provision had exceeded their authority, and thus implied that modifica-
tion of a consent decree is easily available for terms not constitutionally required.
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Circuit is only a hint,1 23 and the Ninth Circuit decision is not explicit,
so the law remains unclear.
E. The Preferable Modification Standard for Litigated Injunctions
and Consent Decrees
The modification standard applied by the courts remains strict,
and confusion surrounds the question of whether to distinguish litigated
and consensual orders. What is the most desirable approach? The
courts' adherence to the strict Swift modification standard for both
types of injunctions is wise policy. In the case of litigated injunctions,
the trial provides a full record of all the facts. Both parties have an
opportunity to raise all their claims and defenses. After the court enters
judgment, the parties have the opportunity for appellate review. Thus,
both parties have access to all the facts and all the questions have been
fully examined. The result of this careful effort should not be set aside
short of a dramatic change in conditions-the situation accommodated
in Swift.
With consent decrees, negotiations do not begin until discovery is
well under way. Extensive discovery allows both parties access to all
the facts. The parties are represented by counsel engaged in arms-
length negotiations, and they enter the agreement voluntarily, with
their eyes open. As with litigated injunctions, neither party must take
any risks based on ignorance. The parties have a duty to anticipate
reasonable future changes, and if either side makes what turns out to
be a bad bargain, it should not be relieved simply because they did not
predict the future accurately. Short of drastic change, the parties
should assume the risk of their own misjudgments; they should be al-
lowed relief only when they can meet the rigorous standard of Swift.
These policies are not affected because one of the litigants happens
to be the state. The eleventh amendment prohibits lawsuits against a
state directly, so these conditions suits are filed against the individual
state officers in their official capacity.1 24 Defendants have argued that
an injunction entered against their predecessors cannot bind them.1 21
This argument has been rejected by the courts,126 and wisely so. Two
drawbacks would arise from endorsing such a loophole. First, the de-
123. See supra note 121.
124. See Penwell, 700 F.2d at 573 n.3, 574 and cases cited therein.
125. See, e.g., Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1517-18 (11th Cir. 1984); Duran v.
Carruthers, 678 F. Supp. 839, 851 (D.N.M. 1988).
126. See, e.g., Newman, 740 F.2d at 1517-18.
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fendants could easily avoid the court order by changing personnel. Sec-
ond, this approach would create an incentive to change state officers,
thereby undermining professionalism and continuity. Furthermore, as a
policy matter, state officials should not be held to a lesser standard on
their errors in judgment than private litigants. State officials are not
under any special or particular disability that would militate for differ-
ent treatment; they should bear the risk of their mistakes like any other
party. Thus, the law does not treat state officials differently, and it
should not. Standards for modification should not be readjusted be-
cause one of the parties is the state.
Finality in the terms of these prison injunctions is important for
reasons unrelated to whether the injunction is agreed upon or litigated.
The goal of these lawsuits is dissolution-to get the defendants in com-
pliance with the law and the court out of the prison business. Progress
towards this goal is undermined if modification is readily accessible,
because if modification is always an option, the defendants can hardly
avoid being less committed in their compliance efforts. For example, if
the state legislature denies corrections officials funding to ease over-
crowding, those officials will be less prone to insist on the funding and
more prone to consider the alternative of seeking modification of the
injunction. A strict modification standard forces both parties to priori-
tize their interests and choose their battles judiciously, without relying
on the availability of modification. Moreover, forcing parties to shoul-
der the risk of their own misjudgments creates an incentive for the par-
ties to be cautious, both in negotiating or litigating. The strict modifica-
tion standard also keeps modification motions to a minimum, thus
easing the burden on the courts. Finally, for intractable issues, there is
always the option of the parties themselves agreeing to modify the in-
junction. If the defendant has a serious problem with a term in the
injunction, it will often be a problem for the plaintiff as well. Even if
that term is not a problem for the plaintiff, there may be another provi-
sion on which the plaintiff needs a compromise. For intractable situa-
tions, these private compromises are available solutions regardless of
the legal standard for modification. This option of a private response
indicates further that freer modification is not necessary. Actually, the
strict modification standard promotes cooperation and compromise be-
tween the parties.
Accordingly, no distinction should be made between modification
of litigated injunctions and consent decrees, not because a distinction is
per se unwise, but because both types of injunction independently call
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for application of the strict modification standard.
III. DEFINING THE DISSOLUTION STANDARD
A. Background
The term dissolution, as used in this article, refers to the court's
action in dissolving the injunction. The impact of dissolution differs
slightly for a consent decree and a litigated injunction. With a consent
decree, dissolution ends the contract. No contract would exist without
the court's approval; 27 once the court dissolves the decree, the contract
is deemed performed and neither party has any further duties under it.
The defendant retains the duty to comply with the law but has no duty
to do more than the law requires.
A litigated injunction is more complex. As noted above, a litigated
injunction can only compel the defendants to do the minimum required
by the law,128 that is, run a constitutional prison. Theoretically, dissolu-
tion of that injunction would have no impact because it imposes no
additional duty: The defendant is always required to comply with the
law. Thus, dissolution of a litigated injunction would be a pointless step
if the injunction merely ordered the defendants to run a constitutional
prison. But the injunctions that courts enter after litigation are actually
more detailed. They do not merely order a prison to operate constitu-
tionally; rather, the court selects a specific manner in which the prison
can achieve constitutionality and orders the defendants to pursue that
particular approach. Constitutionality can be achieved on any given
point in a number of ways, but when a court enters an injunction after
litigation, the defendant loses the choice and the court selects the
method. Dissolution of such specific injunctions does have an impact
because once it is dissolved, the defendants can choose their own ap-
proach to achieving constitutionality rather than having one imposed
upon them.
On the other hand, courts entering litigated injunctions will some-
times allow the corrections officials to help define the terms of the in-
junction. A court faced with entering an injunction after prison condi-
tions have been found unconstitutional may give the defendants an
opportunity to submit a plan to cure the problem. This approach ap-
peals to the courts because it undermines the defendants' potential
127. See supra note 18.
128. See supra note 21 and accompanying tex.L
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claims of overintrusiveness 129and makes it awkward for the defendants
to complain about the content of the injunction. When the court takes
this approach, the impact of dissolution on the defendant is reduced
because the impact of the injunction was minimized. Because it was a
litigated injunction, it only ordered the defendants to provide the con-
stitutional minimum, and because the judge allowed the defendant to
participate in defining the cure, the defendant had some input into the
remedy.
Dissolution has another impact on the defendant as a practical
matter. The injunction imposes an administrative burden on the de-
fendants because the court supervision involves a workload in the form
of responses to allegations of noncompliance, correspondence with the
parties and the court, and other miscellaneous matters. Dissolution
eliminates this workload. This impact of dissolution operates equally
for consent decrees and litigated injunctions.
Accordingly, dissolution of either type of injunction leaves defend-
ants with the duty to comply with the law and no more, and leaves to
the defendants the choice of how to achieve that compliance. In addi-
tion, dissolution further relieves the administrative burden on the
defendants.
Relinquishment of jurisdiction refers to the court's action in termi-
nating its supervision over the prison and formally ending the litigation.
The relationship between dissolution and relinquishment of jurisdiction
has not been carefully analyzed. Courts have not distinguished the is-
sues. If the questions are approached separately, it is clear that the
question of whether the court should retain or relinquish jurisdiction is
controlled by the question of whether the court has dissolved the in-
junction. If the injunction is dissolved, there is no point in the court
retaining jurisdiction over the prison and the court should relinquish
jurisdiction. If the injunction has not been dissolved, the court should
obviously retain jurisdiction to monitor compliance. Thus, the real
question is whether the court should dissolve the injunction, and there
is no reason to address relinquishment of jurisdiction as a discrete is-
sue.13° Because courts have not distinguished the issues of dissolution
129. See infra note 133.
130. Cf. Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction Over Consent Decrees, supra
note 29. Professor Anderson considers the questions of dissolution and relinquishment of jurisdic-
tion to be separate questions. Id. at 413. He does not analyze the standards for dissolution of
injunctions. Rather, he assumes that the injunction has not been dissolved, and analyzes two ques-
tions: When should the court release jurisdiction? And if the court does release jurisdiction and
noncompliance recurs, how can the court resume jurisdiction? Professor Anderson's assumed sce-
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and relinquishment of jurisdiction, and because there is no reason to do
so, this article treats these questions together.
Unlike modification, the question of when dissolution is appropri-
ate has not received much attention. Few courts have considered the
issue,131 and commentators have not generally analyzed the dissolution
and modification issues independently. 132 However, dissolution is a dis-
tinct issue because it raises concerns not implicated by modification.
Specifically, the duration of the injunction and concomitant court su-
pervision raises issues of federalism. Federal courts intervening into ar-
eas of state power, like state prison systems, operate under constitu-
tional limits designed to minimize the intrusiveness of the remedy.la
The potential for overintrusiveness flowing from excessive federal court
supervision distinguishes dissolution from modification.13'
Once an injunction is entered, either through consent or after liti-
gation, courts routinely retain jurisdiction of the lawsuit to supervise
the implementation phase."35 The court retains jurisdiction for several
purposes: Retention allows the court to consider remedial questions as
they arise without new suits being filed; it allows the court to supervise
compliance with the injunction generally; and it signals the parties that
the court will continue to be involved-a signal with symbolic value.130
nario-that dissolution of the injunction is not warranted but the court might nonetheless release
jurisdiction to monitor compliance-is unlikely. If the standards for dissolution arc not met, why
would the court give up jurisdiction? The assumption makes some sense when the author provides
his definition of release of jurisdiction. His definition is that such release does not really terminate
jurisdiction or the litigation, but merely places the case on inactive status, Id. at 413, a step that
ends only the court's active supervision. Id. at 404. Thus, a situation could be imagined where the
parties are not entitled to dissolution of the injunction, but the court nevertheless feds safe in
limiting its active supervision. In contrast, in this article, the phrase "relinquish jurisdiction" does
not mean put on inactive status or relinquish active monitoring; instead it means completely termi-
nate supervision and formally end the litigation. With this definition of relinquishment, there is no
point in analyzing relinquishment of jurisdiction separately from dissolution. If the injunction is
not dissolved, the court should retain jurisdiction. If the injunction is dissolved, the court should
terminate jurisdiction. The only real question is should the injunction be dissolved.
131. See infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
132. See Jost, supra note 2, at 1105 n.30; Steinberg, supra note 45, at 41-73. But see Special
Project, supra note 1, at 817-21 (discussion of modification), 842-44 (separate discussion of
dissolution).
133. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Volfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
134. See generally Special Project, supra note 1, at 866-69. The author points out that the
Supreme Court has never reversed a remedial scheme solely on the basis of constitutional oyerin-
trusiveness, but has expressed its concern in several cases. Id. at 868.
135. Id. at 816-17.
136. Id.; see also M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER. JR.. AFTER DECISION: IWFLMENTATION OF JUDI-
CIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS 17-20 (1977).
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Jurisdiction is usually retained for an indefinite period,137 and unless
the decree has an expiration date written into its terms,13 8 it remains in
effect until it is dissolved. Thus, some action is required or the decree
and court supervision will continue indefinitely. How do these lawsuits
end? Some, of course, just lapse into a dormant state from lack of at-
tention, but occasionally parties move to dissolve the injunction.139 In
these cases the courts must define when a particular piece of prison
litigation should end.
B. The Standard: Assessing the Risk of Future Noncompliance
1. Case Law
The Supreme Court has never addressed the dissolution issue in
the context of a prison conditions or an institutional reform case. The
closest Supreme Court authority is United States v. W. T. Grant Co.,2
40
a case in which the United States sought an injunction under the Clay-
ton Act against an individual who held interlocking directorates in
competing corporations. Prior to the issuance of the injunction, the in-
dividual resigned the relevant directorates. The question was whether
the district court had the power to grant the injunction when the illegal
conduct had been discontinued. The Court held that the district court
did retain that power, notwithstanding that there was no "danger of
recurrent violation." The Court stated that the relevant factors to con-
sider were: the "bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effec-
tiveness of the discontinuance and, ...the character of the past viola-
tions."1 41 W.T. Grant is analogous to prison reform cases in that the
illegal conduct had been discontinued, and the question was the power
of the court to enjoin potential illegality. W.T. Grant is dissimilar to
prison reform cases in that the issue in W.T. Grant was, assuming no
current violation, whether an injunction could be entered, whereas the
issue in prison cases is, assuming no current violation, whether the in-
137. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub nom.
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972) ("This Court will retain continuing jurisdiction
over this action and the parties thereto. . . for a sufficient length of time. . . to make it reasona-
bly certain that the changes of methods and practices required will not be abandoned .... "); see
generally Special Project, supra note 1, at 842 & n.494.
138. See Steinberg, supra note 45, at 63-64 (expiration date can be negotiated and included in
the terms of the consent decree).
139. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Bland, 659 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (defendants moved for
dissolution).
140. 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
141. Id. at 633.
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junction must be dissolved. The Supreme Court's decision to allow an
injunction when there was no current illegality indicates that the Court
would not conclude that prison conditions injunctions must be dissolved
simply because there is current compliance. Aside from this case, the
only clue to the Court's attitude toward dissolution is its repeated em-
phasis on deference to state administrators. 142
Several circuit courts, however, have confronted the specific ques-
tion of when dissolution and relinquishment of jurisdiction are proper.
In Battle v. Anderson,14 3 the Tenth Circuit examined how long the su-
pervision of the Oklahoma prison system should continue. The court
stated that the goal of judicial intervention is the permanent achieve-
ment of remedial objectives and not total implementation of the
changes required in the decree.1 44 Thus, while concluding that the dis-
trict court retained jurisdiction over the system, the court of appeals
also recognized that there were limits to the jurisdiction: "These limits
are defined by the purpose of the continuing jurisdiction-to assure
that the court's intervention has achieved lasting institutional reform.
Accordingly, the court may exercise continuing jurisdiction over the
Oklahoma prison system to the extent necessary to assure that eighth
amendment violations will not recur."14 5
The First Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Lovell v. Bren-
nan.46 In affirming the district court's denial of continued jurisdiction
over prison suits, the court stated that in certain circumstances jurisdic-
tion could be retained in order to monitor conditions at a prison, but
only "if it found a likelihood that the constitutional rights of the plain-
tiffs would be violated in the near future. 1 47
Similarly, in Taylor v. Sterrett, the Fifth Circuit concluded that if
there is no evidence that the violations initially remedied are likely to
recur, then retention of jurisdiction and continued monitoring by the
district court exceed the court's authority and are error. " And the
142. See, e.g., Turner v. Safely, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62 (1987); O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404-05 (1987); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322-26 (1986);
Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985); Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531 (1979).
143. 708 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed sub nont. Meachum v. Battle, 465 U.S.
1014 (1984).
144. Id. at 1539 (quoting Special Project, supra note 1, at 842.43). In other words, if the
goals are achieved without total implementation, the remaining changes are unnecessary.
145. Id..
146. 728 F.2d 560 (1st Cir. 1984).
147. Id. at 564.
148. 600 F.2d 1135, 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally Anderson, Release and Re-
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Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court's decision to retain jurisdiction
"for a sufficient length of time . . . to make it reasonably certain that
the changes of methods and practices required will not be abandoned,
forgotten, or neglected, but have become permanently established."149
These circuit court cases are consistent with W. T. Grant " in that
they express a future-oriented dissolution standard. 51 This approach
also is consistent with the theory of equitable relief, the purpose of
which is not to punish, but to deter illegal conduct in the future. 1 2 If
an injunction is no longer necessary to deter future noncompliance, it
stands only as a punishment for past transgressions and should be dis-
solved. Alternatively, if the injunction is still deterring noncompliance,
it should be continued. 53
2. Relevant Factors in Assessing the Risk of Future Noncompliance
The future-oriented dissolution analysis is problematic because it
involves prediction of the risk of future violations. 5 What evidence
should courts look to in predicting that risk? Some factors relevant to
the risk of future violations are more easily identified than others. As
the Supreme Court noted, one index is "the bona fides of the expressed
intent to comply. ''155 Assuming the defendants articulate their intent to
comply, how can the court assess the bona fides of that intent? Two
indices are the defendant's track record with respect to compliance and
its cooperative spirit, including good faith efforts to comply. 5" It is also
possible, but extremely rare, for the defendant to replace correction of-
ficials who were responsible for prior misconduct.
A second factor mentioned by the Supreme Court is "the effective-
sumption of Jurisdiction over Consent Decrees, supra note 29, at 409 n.32.
149. Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affid sub nom. Jones v.
Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
150. 345 U.S. 629; see supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
1 51. See Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction over Consent Decrees, supra note
29, at 406 (articulating two-pronged test for release of jurisdiction that focuses, in part, on the
likelihood that defendants will violate the decree in the future). See generally id. at 409-12.
152. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
153. See generally Steinberg, supra note 45, at 60-64.
154. Of course, the difficulty of predicting the recurrence of violations will vary with the par-
ticular issues involved. If a prison builds a hospital wing to provide constitutional medical care, the
facility will likely be there for some time. In contrast, it is very difficult to guage the likelihood of
overcrowding because intake increases are often unpredictable.
155. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633.
156. Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction over Consent Decrees, supra note 29,
at 411.
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ness of the discontinuance."' 15 The more common term for this factor
is compliance. Substantial compliance is surely necessary for dissolu-
tion of an injunction. The more critical question is whether substantial
compliance158 is sufficient for dissolution of an injunction. The cases
examined above indicate that mere compliance is not sufficient. Rather,
there must be some basis for the court to conclude not just that there
are no violations today, but also that there will be no violations to-
morrow. 59 Only one case has suggested that mere compliance is suffi-
cient for dissolution. In Washington v. Penwell,60 the decree required
inter alia that the defendant state officials fund legal services for in-
mates, provide paralegals and libraries, and develop plans for inmate
access to the courts.16 1 The district court judge found the defendants to
be in substantial compliance with the paralegal and library provisions,
modified the decree to eliminate the other requirements, terminated ju-
risdiction, and dismissed the action.16 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, stating that "the finding that defendants had
complied with the library and paralegal provisions of the decrees was
not clearly erroneous. These provisions did not require further enforce-
ment."'' 3 This language suggests that the district court's finding of
compliance alone was enough to warrant dissolution. As noted above,
Penwell is an aberration with respect to modification standards, and it
has turned out to be an aberration on dissolution standards as well.
Commentators have agreed with the majority view that compliance
alone is not sufficient to warrant dissolution.'"
157. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633.
158. Courts distinguish total compliance from substantial compliance; only substantial compli-
ance is required for terminating a consent decree. See. e.g., Washington v. Penwell. 700 F.2d 570.
572 (9th Cir. 1983) (consent decree terminated partly because defendants in substantial compli-
ance with decree provisions concerning libraries and paralegals); see also Anderson, Release and
Resumption of Jurisdiction Over Consent Decrees, supra note 29, at 406 (compliance as one
prong of two-pronged test).
159. See Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction over Consent Decrees, supra note
29, at 404 ("[T]he judge should release jurisdiction if the defendant has substantially complied
with the decree, and if there is no reasonable likelihood that the defendant will violate the decree
in the future."); see also id. at 406 (proposing same two-pronged test).
160. 700 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1983).
161. Id. at 572.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 575.
164. See Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction over Consent Decrees, supra note
29, at 406 (two-pronged test for release of jurisdiction: substantial compliance and no risk of
noncompliance in future); Jost, supra note 2, at 1151-52 (compliance is only a mitigating factor if
other reasons to dissolve the injunction are present); Steinberg, supra note 45, at 66 (compliance
alone is not sufficient, but compliance with two other factors-hardship on the enjoined party and
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The final factor recognized by the Supreme Court is the character
of past violations.165 In the prison context, application of this factor
presumably indicates that the more extensive and egregious the uncon-
stitutional conditions of confinement, the more wary a court should be
of concluding that there is no danger of future violations.,"
In predicting the risk of recurrent noncompliance, district judges
may also consider other factors that indicate that the changes are per-
manent or temporary. For example, they might look to proposed state
budgets and prison appropriations,167 legislative acts relating to the
prisons, and prison policies in assessing how ingrained the changes
are.16
8
One factor not mentioned in the cases that is relevant in predicting
future violations is the educational impact of recent Supreme Court
guidance in defining the constitutional prison.169 As more cases are
handed down in this young area, prison administrators are being edu-
cated in two ways. First, these cases make prison administrators and
state legislators aware of minimum constitutional requirements. Sec-
ond, the cases also show administrators what happens to a system when
those minimums are not met-the local federal court will supervise the
prison's administration. This increased guidance of the substantive law,
coupled with the knowledge that failure to comply will result in contin-
ued federal court involvement, gives state officials both the ability and
the incentive to avoid future violations.170 Therefore, the educational
impact of prison reform lawsuits may diminish the risk of future un-
constitutionality, making dissolution more feasible.171
rehabilitation-is sufficient to dissolve injunction).
165. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633.
166. For example, if the prisoners are badly beaten and brutalized, a court should be cautious
in predicting that brutality will not recur.
167. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Bland, 659 F. Supp. 1188, 1196, 1198, 1200-01 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
168. See generally id.
169. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
170. It might be argued that this view is naive; that in other areas, like school desegregation,
years of litigation have had little impact on recurring unconstitutionality. But prison reform is
distinguishable from school desegregation in that constitutionality standards have been more
clearly defined, and the defendants' incentive to comply is reinforced by the threat of individual
damage suits. Individual suits are not a significant threat in school desegregation law.
171. In analyzing the propriety of dissolution, if we go beyond the limited focus on the likeli-
hood of future violations, other factors become relevant. Professor Steinberg has identified two
ways in which the public interest would be disserved by making dissolution readily available. See
Steinberg, supra note 45, at 62. First, structural injunctions serve not only as a specific deterrent
to future violations, but also as a general deterrent. Therefore, a stringent dissolution standard has
a beneficial deterrent impact on prison systems other than those engaged in illegal conduct. Id.
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C. The Best Approach to Dissolution
The current legal standard for dissolution of prison conditions in-
junctions requires the defendant to prove that it is currently in substan-
tial compliance with the injunction and that there is no risk of recur-
ring violations in the future. Thus, dissolution is not a question of the
past (punishment), but of the present (compliance) and the future (risk
of noncompliance). This formulation of the dissolution standard is sen-
sible; the courts are wise to require both current compliance and evi-
dence that the compliance will continue. Dissolving the injunction if the
prison were not presently in compliance would render the litigation
pointless. Likewise, dissolving the injunction if the evidence indicated
noncompliance was likely to recur in the future would defeat the pur-
pose of the litigation because it would require only temporary changes
by the defendant. The courts' analyses of the risk of future noncompli-
ance ensures that the purpose of the prison reform lawsuit-permanent
change-is achieved.
When courts are assessing the risk of future noncompliance, there
are several factors the courts consider. One factor which has received
no attention but should be considered is the educational impact of
prison reform litigation during the last twenty years. As noted above,
state prison administrators and state legislators have been educated on
the requirements of a constitutional prison.
Although the dissolution standard is sensible, and the few cases
decided indicate that the courts are applying it conscientiously, courts
may fall prey to an unarticulated reluctance to dissolve the injunc-
tions.' 72 This reluctance has three causes. First, the courts have no es-
tablished tradition of dissolving these injunctions, and in a system
based on precedent, a lack of experience can make a court wary. Sec-
ond, the courts are aware that many states are struggling with budget
Second, if-dissolution is readily available, congestion will result as parties badger the courts with
frequent motions to dissolve the injunctions. Id. These concerns cannot be accommodated by the
future-oriented focus of the current dissolution standard. Whether the standard should be adjusted
to accommodate such concerns is a more thorny question. These are speculative concerns. Even
assuming they are deemed compelling, they are insufficient justification for continuing an injunc-
tion against a prison, or prison system, that has established no risk of future noncompliance. Such
injunctions limit the methods prison administrators can use to achieve compliance with the law
and also impose administrative burdens. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
172. Only six states have been released from the supervision of a court in a major conditions
lawsuit: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Utah. Telephone Survey by the
Kentucky Cabinet for Corrections, Nov. 1986; see also Special Project, supra note I, at 842;
NATIONAL PRISON PROJECr, Number 13, Fall 1987, at 24 (listing the status or 80 prison suits
currently pending in 47 states and the District of Columbia).
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crunches, and corrections is an easy area to target for reduced spend-
ing. Thus, courts are reluctant to conclude that there is no risk of fu-
ture noncompliance and relinquish their authority over the prison .1 3
Third, the courts may be generally reluctant to commit to a prediction
of the future when the alternative is merely to continue the status
quo-to keep monitoring the parties' compliance with the injunction.
Although a court may be tempted to act with an excess of caution
and continue the injunction, there are several reasons why courts
should resist any intuitive sentiment against dissolution. If the dissolu-
tion standard is met, that is, there is current compliance and no risk of
future noncompliance, there is no reason for the court to continue the
injunction. At this point, the injunction serves no purpose and the fed-
eral court's involvement in the state's business is overintrusive and dis-
rupts the balance of federalism. Moreover, dissolution is not irrepara-
ble. If the court dissolves the injunction and it turns out that the
defendant is soon operating unconstitutionally, the plaintiffs can always
present the issue again, either through a new lawsuit or through re-
sumption of the old one.174 Either way, the plaintiffs are not left unpro-
tected once the injunction is dissolved. Finally, the defendants have an
incentive to continue complying with the law independent of their quest
for dissolution of the injunction. Once the injunction is dissolved, pris-
oners can file individual suits against the state system and get damages
if their constitutional rights are violated. These damage actions remain
available to prisoners after the injunction is dissolved and, therefore,
create an incentive for the state to continue operating constitutionally.
Thus, the courts should not be hesitant to grant dissolution if the stan-
dard is met.17 5
173. When a court refuses to dissolve an injunction entered against correction officials because
of suspicion that the state legislature will reduce spending on corrections and the prisons will sink
into illegality, the court actually becomes the correction officials' ally in working towards adequate
funding.
174. See generally Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction over Consent Decrees,
supra, note 29, at 413-16.
175. Courts recognize that it is best to end their involvement in the state prison systems
promptly. See, e.g., Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194, 216 (8th Cir. 1974)
("We recognize that the sooner the district court may discharge its jurisdiction of the case, the
better it is for everyone."), affid sub nom. Hutto v. Finney, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979); see also Ander-
son, Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction Over Consent Decrees supra, note 29, at 409-11
(articulating three reasons why it is important for courts to confront and decide the issue of
whether to release jurisdiction); Special Project, supra note 1, at 844 ("Although detailed sub-
stantive provisions offer considerable advantages for monitoring compliance and for administra-
tion, they restrict the defendants in ways that may prove unreasonable in the long run.").
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D. The Relationship between the Modification and Dissolution
Standards
The strict modification standard and the dissolution standard are a
good combination. Dissolution is the ultimate goal of prison reform liti-
gation because dissolution means that the corrections system is in com-
pliance with federal law and there is no reason to doubt that compli-
ance will continue. As noted above, dissolution restores the balance of
federalism. It allows the state administrators to make their own choices
on how to remain in compliance with the law, and it reduces the ad-
ministrative burden on the defendants. In addition, the plaintiffs are
not left unprotected by dissolution because they can reopen the lawsuit
or file a new one.
Adopting a free, flexible modification standard would undermine
the ultimate goal of dissolution. Planning toward dissolution would be
impossible if the standards for compliance were always shifting in re-
sponse to modifications. Moreover, if modification were always an op-
tion, it would too easily replace dissolution as the goal of the parties. A
stringent modification standard is essential to moving the parties to-
ward the goal of dissolution rather than postponing any conclusion
through a potentially endless series of adjustments and modifications.
CONCLUSION
Courts resist the modification of structural injunctions in prison
reform cases. While some courts discuss a more relaxed standard for
modification, close analysis of the case law reveals continued reliance
on the strict modification standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Swift and Stotts. The issue of whether consensual and litigated injunc-
tions should be distinguished with respect to ease of modification is
confused, and even courts that agree there should be some distinction
cannot agree on its impact. The wisest course is for courts not to distin-
guish litigated and consensual injunctions but to review both types
under the stringent Swift standard. Litigated and consensual injunc-
tions both deserve the respect of finality. As for dissolution, courts gen-
erally agree on the legal standard and relevant factors. One factor
which courts have overlooked is the educational impact of prison re-
form litigation over the last 20 years. But courts must guard against
reluctance to dissolve prison reform injunctions. This reluctance is un-
warranted if the dissolution standard is met.
The combination of a strict standard for modification and a
future-oriented standard for dissolution should provide the necessary
1988]
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institutional reform. Dissolution is the ultimate goal of prison reform
litigation; the strict modification standard actually encourages progress
toward this goal. Once the dissolution standard is met, that is, once
compliance is achieved and there is no risk of falling out of compliance
in the future, the federal court can dissolve the injunction and relin-
quish supervision of the prisons to state officials.
